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Abstract: This study analyzes the nature of money through
the lens of the international principles of accounting and
lays the foundations of what it calls the accounting view of
money (AVM). Using international accounting principles,
the AVM argues that the fiat monies issued by the state
(typically, cash, banknotes, and central bank money) are
not debt and that in fractional reserve regimes, only a
share of commercial bank money can be regarded as debt.
The AVM argues, instead, that state monies and the non-
debt share of commercial bank money are net wealth of
their holders and net worth (equity) of their issuers and
determines how the seigniorage associated with money
issuance should be accounted for correctly in the finan-
cial statements of the issuing institutions. The AVM
points to the correct way to account for the various forms
of money in the financial statements of the issuing insti-
tutions, clarifies what the different accounting treatments
imply for a correct understanding of the concept of
money, and evaluates the related economic and eco-
nomic policy implications.
Keywords: accounting, central bank money and capital,
commercial banks, deposits, debt, equity, payment settle-
ments, seigniorage
1 Introduction
This study reevaluates the nature of money through the
lens of the international principles and standards of
accounting and lays the foundations of what it labels as
the Accounting View of Money (AVM), following our ear-
lier preliminary contribution to the topic (Bossone, Costa,
Cuccia, & Valenza, 2018). The AVM considers the various
forms that money may take, starting from coins (the oldest
type of money), to banknotes and commercial bank
demand deposits, and can be extended to new forms of
money such as electronic money and digital currencies
(CPMI, 2015). Coins still to date circulate as legal tender
in national jurisdictions worldwide. In many jurisdictions,
they are treated as debt liabilities of the issuing states and
are reported as a component of public debt under national
accounting statistics (ESA, 2010). Similarly, banknotes
issued by central banks and by extension central bank
reserves are accounted for as debt owed by the issuing
central banks to those holding banknotes and reserves,
respectively, and this will equally hold in the future for
central bank digital currencies. Demand deposits issued by
commercial banks to their clients are considered a fortiori
as debt liabilities of the issuing banks and represent the
counterparts to the value held by depositors on the demand
deposit accounts open with those banks. Thus, they are
claims of the clients on their deposit banks.
Although the law says that money is “debt,” a correct
application of the existing accounting principles raises
serious doubts about such conception of money nowa-
days. Debt involves obligations to transfer economic
resources from borrowers to lenders (IASB, 2018). Yet,
one should wonder: Which obligations derive today for
the state from the public holding coins? Or which obliga-
tions derive for the central bank from financial institu-
tions holding banknotes or reserves? And in the case of
commercial bank deposits, how does their nature of debt
obligations relate to the circumstance that a large share
of such deposits is never going to be redeemed for cash or
other settlement instruments under most circumstances?
Moreover, are not nondebt money liabilities a source of
income for their issuers (also known as “seigniorage”),
which originates from the power to issue money at a cost
that is lower than the attendant revenue? If so, how should
issuing institutions account for these sources of income in
their financial statements? Are current accounting prac-
tices satisfactory in this respect?
Proceeding separately for the monies issued by the
state, on the one hand, and those issued by commercial
banks, on the other hand, the AVM points to the correct
way to account for them in the financial statements of the
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issuing institutions, clarifies what the different accounting
treatments imply for a correct understanding of the con-
cept of money, and evaluates the related economic and
economic policy implications.
More broadly, the AVM aims to resolve the apparent
inconsistency between the formal rules of reporting money
liabilities in the financial statements of the issuing institu-
tions and the economic substance of the money liabilities
to be reported in the statements. The main motivation
of AVM lies on defining the correct representations of
money in accounting terms and on drawing the implica-
tions that the correct representations of money would
bring to bear for economic analysis – noting that “incor-
rect” are all representations of economic phenomena that
are no longer consistent with the economic context as it
has evolved over time and which therefore do no longer
reflect the substance of the economic phenomena as they
have changed with the evolution of the underlying context.
This study will make several references to “selling”
and “leasing” (or “lending”) money. In a general sense,
and for purposes of analogy with the sale of goods,
money is “sold” whenever it is exchanged for other forms
of value (e.g., goods, services, real or financial assets,
or other currencies) and its ownership changes hands,
either permanently or temporarily.¹ While the distinction
will be maintained throughout the study, between money
“sale” and “lease” (or “lending”), a “sale” of money
is involved when the money is issued against deposit
claims in exchange for funds, securities, or credit claims
transactions.²
In point of methodology, while accounting practices
vary across countries, and in particular across central banks
(Archer & Moser-Boehm, 2013), this study takes the new
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (henceforth,
the Conceptual Framework) as a main reference, which
underpins the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). The IFRS reflects the state of the art, internationally
recognized accounting doctrine and can thus well serve as
guiding principles, especially on such general accounting
issues as financial liabilities. While central banks and gov-
ernment agencies are neither required nor expected to
observe the IFRS, reference to them is justified on the basis
that the purpose of keeping correct accounting records is,
and should be, the same for both institutions that pursue
private profits and those that are responsible for protecting
public interests.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature on the practices currently in use to account
for money in the balance sheet and financial statement
positions of money issuers; the section also reviews the
literature on seigniorage (including that on commercial
banks). Section 3 describes the AVM, shows how different
types of money should be understood according to the
new approach, and identifies the sources of seigniorage
deriving from the power to issue money; the section also
points to how the types of money being discussed should
be treated based on the relevant international accounting
principles. With specific reference to commercial banks,
the section shows the nature of hybrid institutions (part
creators of money, and part pure financial intermedi-
aries) and similarly shows the hybrid nature of their
deposit liabilities as financial instruments. Section 4 con-
cludes this study.

1 The sale of money or of any other form of value involves an
“exchange transaction” as an operation where one party sells to
(or purchases from) another party some value in exchange for
some other form of value. We quote in this regard IPSAS no. 9, which
defines “exchange transactions” as «Transactions in which one
entity receives assets, or services, or has liabilities extinguished,
and directly gives approximately equal value (primarily in the
form of cash, goods, services or use of assets). The International
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) are the accounting
standards for public bodies and are derived from the IFRS used
for the private sector. The case of repurchase agreements, for
instance, points to how a lending operation can be structured,
both legally and economically, as a temporary sale of money with
an obligation from the seller to repurchase the money at a future
date. In any case, the strict legal terminology is not so relevant in
accounting: as the general principle of “Prevalence of substance
over form” holds, whenever an exchange bears the substance of a
sale, it is a sale.
2 Money leasing or lending transactions can be conceptualized as
“sale” transactions, for instance, when depositors lend funds to
banks or when banks lend deposit claims to borrowers. In these
cases, too, the ownership of the funds loaned does change hands

like in all sale/purchase transactions until transactions of opposite
sign take place and offset the effects of the previous transactions –
such as when funds depositor withdraw cash or request their banks
to make payments from their accounts or when borrowers repay
their debts. When a bank lends money, the operation can be broken
into the following ones: (i) the bank sells new deposit claims by
crediting the account of the borrower with the loan amount; (ii)
the borrower sells deposit claims back to the bank in exchange for
funds, whenever she has to make payments to agents holding
accounts with other banks; (iii) the borrower resells the funds to
the bank when her debt is due, in exchange for the extinction of her
debt obligations. For an application of the money “sale” concept to
today’s digital currencies and the related legal underpinnings, see
Bossone (2021a).
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2 Review of the Literature
Until recently, the accounting literature on money liabil-
ities has been rather scant, as shown by the survey on
financial accounting practices by Beatty and Liao (2014).
The reason for this lack of interest by the community of
scholars has historical roots: originally, money liabilities
were plain debt liabilities and were allocated as such
in the financial statements of the issuing institutions:
there was no point in further investigating their nature;
inertia has done the rest. This vision is, for instance,
reflected in Mehrling’s (2012) hierarchy of money, and
even more explicitly in the theory of state money, origi-
nated by Knapp (1905) and resurrected in recent years
(see Wray, 1998), which view all monies as debt and
consider that the acceptance of state money in payment
of taxes makes state money a government liability. This
vision is rejected by the AVM and other more recent con-
tributions, as discussed in Section 3. In fact, research has
been produced lately, which is “refreshing” the subject
and is possibly preparing the ground for some new inter-
esting developments.
On the accounting of central bank money, a relevant
contribution is the work by Archer and Moser-Boehm
(2013), where the narrow concept of equity capital is
replaced with the broader one of “positive comprehen-
sive net worth,” which in addition to conventional
shareholder equity includes the stock of banknotes out-
standing and the present value of future seigniorage
income. In particular, as regards banknotes, the authors
argue that they “…act more like equity capital than debt
obligations. As they bear no interest and are perpetual in
character, they provide a stable funding base for income
generation. To the extent that net income can be retained
when needed, a large share of banknote liabilities pro-
vides a base for rebuilding equity if it has been depleted
by a negative shock” (pp. 33–34). Archer and Moser-
Boehm, however, do not dig further into this line of
enquiry and do not extend the sources of income beyond
banknote, as this study does.
Reis (2019) considers banknotes not to be a liability
of the central bank, but a durable good that the central
bank produces and sells and argues that central bank
money could be considered as part of the public debt,
but this would then require including their attendant
seigniorage as a source of funds. This is not inconsistent
with the AVM.
In line with the AVM, Zellweger-Gutknecht (2019)
questions whether central bank money can be character-
ized as a form of (quasi) equity since it no longer obliges
the central bank to exchange it for an asset other than
central bank money, but unlike the AVM, their answer
relates the nature of money with the time profile of its
creation: while money created permanently (at the full
discretion of the central bank) over the course of outright
transactions can no longer be considered as debt and
should be instead regarded as a form of equity, money
created through temporary operations (say, liquidity repo
or swap transactions) is still closer to classical debt than
equity since it subjects the central bank to an obligation
to execute reverse transactions later. This conclusion
differs from the AVM, as discussed in Section 3, which
shows that the time profile of money creation is not a
determinant of the nature of money as equity.
Finally, and importantly, the views expressed by
Kumhof et al. (2020) substantially converge with those
of the AVM on state money, by the authors’ own admis-
sion referring to our earlier work cited. They concur that
central bank money cannot be characterized as a liability
of the central bank since, in fiat money systems, the cen-
tral bank is under no legal obligation to repay money
holders in anything other than central bank money. How-
ever, they refrain from describing the latter as equity and
consider it as a hybrid financial instrument called “social
equity,” out of concerns that its categorization as equity
might raise conflicts between shareholders groups and
other stakeholders. In fact, as discussed in Section 3,
once both the distinction between equity and capital
and the nature of money as a claim are clarified, it can
be concluded the AVM’s view of money as equity cannot
give rise to any misunderstandings in terms of its asso-
ciated rights and obligations.
For the record, Covick and Davis (1990) should be
recognized as the first authors (to our knowledge, at least)
who claimed against considering banknotes as state liabil-
ities, noting that they should be accounted for as a source
of revenues (seigniorage), with implications for the public
debt to be considered.
The AVM relates to the debate on the ontology of
money, hosted by the Cambridge Journal of Economics
in a special issue dedicated to the topic.³ In this respect,
it goes beyond the conventional bipartition of commodity-
based versus credit-based money, which underlies that
debate, in that it proposes neither a commodity nor a
credit theory of money, but an “equity theory” of money
(with specific qualifications for commercial bank money).
As discussed in Section 3, the AVM emphasizes that those

3 See Cambridge Journal of Economics, Special issue: Cambridge
Social Ontology: Clarification, Development and Deployment, 41(5),
August 2017.
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who receive money claims acquire generalized purchasing
power on national wealth, while those entities that have
the power to issue money claims by fiat generate for them-
selves a form of the gross income of equal nominal value,
which must then be recorded as such. The AVM, thus,
resembles Heinsohn and Steiger’s (2013) conception of
money as a nonphysical title to the property; yet, the
resemblance ends here since for them money is never
net worth to its issuer, whereas money as equity is the
essence of the AVM.
Moreover, the relation of this study with the work
by Bezemer (2016) must be acknowledged, in particular
its emphasis on the need to involve an “accounting view”
of the economy when rethinking money and banking,
whereby the financial reciprocity between economic units
(e.g., firms, banks, households or nations), which is reflected
in balance sheets and accounting conventions, should be a
central element for understanding the economic process.
However, while Bezmer’s work uses this view to defend
the credit theory of money as the ultimate understanding
of money, this study uses accounting principles to establish
a new, alternative view of the contemporary forms of money.
The AVM view of money as equity also extends to a
share of commercial bank money, as Section 3 illustrates.
However, no relevant literature exists on the accounting
treatment of commercial bank money (demand deposits)
other than as commercial bank liabilities, and the issue is
disregarded by the international accounting standards
(the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)),
national accounting standards (the General Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP)) and the existing national
banking legislations.⁴ However, for the purpose of this
study, the literature on hybrid financial instruments (i.e.,
instruments that are partly debt liabilities and partly
equity capital) is highly relevant. According to PAAinE
(2008), Schmidt (2013), and PWC (2017), the distinction
between liabilities and equity as basic sources of funding
for banks is no longer as neat and sharp as it used to be,
calling into question the conventional definition of equity
capital as the mere algebraic difference between assets
and liabilities. For a company, in fact, equity capital is a
source of funding much as debt liabilities are, with the
difference that, unlike the latter, equity capital is not to
be refunded to the company’s owners unless and until the
company enters into liquidation procedures.
The application of the AVM to commercial bank
money builds on Costa (2009), which shows the historical
process of gradual transformation of commercial bank
money (demand deposits) from debt to equity, and on
Bossone (2001), which shows how payment settlement
rules affect such transformation. As discussed in Section
3, the case is made for deposits being a hybrid instru-
ment, that is, partly debt and partly equity, based on
stochastic considerations. The logic underpinning the
recent pronouncement by the International Public Sector
Accounting Standards Board – the international stan-
dards setting body for the public sector – on liabilities
and probabilities thrust significant support to the AVM
(IPSASB, 2020).
The tax accounting literature (Flinn, 1999), too, is
relevant for the purpose of this study, as the distinction
it introduces between capital gains and revenues allows
to apply the accounting definition of hybrid financial
instruments to commercial bank money liabilities in the
context of the AVM.
Money as equity presupposes that seigniorage income
accrues to money issuers. As regards state seigniorage,
the literature is quite well known and extended (see
Baltensperger & Jordan, 1997a; Burdekin, 2009; Haslag, 1998;
and the recent comprehensive review by Bjerg, McCann,
Macfarlane, Nielsen, & Ryan-Collins, 2017). This study
introduces new components into the definition and mea-
surement of seigniorage; it also distinguishes between pri-
mary and secondary seigniorage in a way that concep-
tually resembles the distinction adopted by Bjerg et al.
(2017) betweenmonetary and opportunity cost seigniorage
but uses different definitions and measurements based on
the application of correct accounting principles. As dis-
cussed later, this has significant financial and fiscal impli-
cations that need to be explored.
Concerning the seigniorage extracted by commercial
banks, early references in the literature are Baltensperger
and Jordan (1997b) and Bossone (2000, 2001). The topic has
been quantitatively explored by Arby (2006), Cardoso (2003),
Soldatos and Varelas (2015), and recently by Bjerg et al.
(2017), Macfarlane, Ryan-Collins, Bjerg, Nielsen, andMcCann
(2017), Bossone et al. (2018) and Bossone (2021b).
3 The AVM
The AVM considers the various forms of fiat money that
are today commonly used worldwide as legal tender or
settlement instruments and the money issued by com-
mercial banks as demand deposits and redefines their

4 For example, the “Debiti verso la clientela” in Italy, the “Opérations
avec la clientele” in France, and the “Customer accounts” in the
United Kingdom, are all represented as debt liabilities in accordance
with their respective national legislations.
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nature based on the correct application of the relevant
international financial accounting principles. It deals
separately with state money, on the one hand, and com-
mercial bank money, on the other hand.
3.1 State Money
Traditionally, and for a long time, sovereigns used to
guarantee that the coins they issued contained specific
amounts of precious metals. To the extent that no debase-
ment of coinage would take place (e.g., via clipping or
sweating), no accounting standards could be possibly
conceived of that would consider full-bodied golden or
silver coins as originating debt obligations for the issuing
sovereigns. Later, however, banknotes gave holders the
right to claim for their conversion into silver or gold
(Costa, 2009) and, still later on, similar obligations fell
on central banks as they would face claims from holders
of their reserve liabilities (typically, commercial banks).
Both banknotes and central banks’ reserves, thus, origi-
nated true debt obligations that were legally binding on
their issuers.
Today, convertibility has all but disappeared for all
three types of money. Coins have lost most of their rele-
vance and have largely been replaced with paper money
and today, increasingly, by electronic money (which is
convertible only in cash and bank deposits). The converti-
bility of banknotes was suspended almost everywhere
before World War II and never re-enacted, implying abol-
ishment in practice, and the abandonment of the gold-
exchange standard (about half a century ago)marked the
demise of “debt” banknotes even at the international
level. Finally, the reserve deposits held by commercial
banks and national treasuries at central banks are today
delinked from obligations of conversion into commod-
ities or third-party liabilities (except where the central
bank adheres to fixed exchange rate arrangements, the
economy is dollarized, or the country is under a currency
board regime), and a liability that is not to be settled in
anything but itself is not a liability. Any institutions
holding central bank money may use it as a settlement
asset but may ask nothing in exchange for it to the issuing
central bank. They may request the central bank to convert
it into cash, but cash, too, is issued by the central bank.
Institutions holding central bank money do hold an eco-
nomic resource that has value erga omnes vis-à-vis other
economic agents, but not vis-à-vis the issuing central
bank: they hold a generic asset, not a credit. If it is not
credit for the holder, it is not debt for the issuer. In
conclusion, although all the aforementioned forms of
money are still recorded as debt in public finance statistics
and central bank financial statements, they are not debt
in the sense of carrying obligations that imply creditor
rights.⁵
Finally, the AVM rejects the notion that all money is
debt and that debt obligations arise when money issuers
promise to accept their own money for debt settlement
from their borrowers. Debt is a current obligation of an
agent to transfer (not to accept) an economic resource as
a result of past events. As fiat money represents a claim
on real resources, when it is returned to the state for tax
payments, it constitutes a transfer of real resources from
the economy to the state. The state accepts money much
as any other agent in the economy does. The commitment
of the state to extinguishing tax obligations as it receives
claims on real resources at settlement is not debt, and
to the extent that the state relieves itself from any obliga-
tion to redeem the money received into nothing but its
liabilities, no debt–credit relationships are left standing
between the state and the taxpayers.⁶ Other compelling
arguments are offered by Kumhof et al. (2020), fully in
line with the AVM, against the argument that state money
is debt on the grounds that the state accepts it in payment
of taxes.
3.1.1 Accounting Treatment
Importantly, the International Public Sector Accounting
Standards Board has officially taken a position whereby
(i) when there is a substantial engagement to give

5 In the EU, for instance, according to Eurostat, also the coins
issued by central governments in the euro area are, by convention,
treated as liabilities of the national central banks, which as a coun-
terpart hold a notional claim on general government. See item 5.2.2.
of the Classification of Financial Transactions, Regulation (EU) No
549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
May 2013.
6 To Mehrling’s (2012) claim that, “From the point of view of the
system as a whole, every liability is someone else’s asset,” (p. 6) we
counterclaim that, on the other hand, it is not necessarily always the
case that every asset is somebody else’s liabilities, we respond with
Buiter (2003) that, “Base money (…) does not have to be redeemed
by the government – ever. It is the final means of settlement of
government obligations vis-à-vis the private sector. It does not
represent a claim on the issuer other than the same amount of
itself.” As shown by Costa (2009), with fiat money being irredeem-
able, no holder may ask the issuing entity to exchange it into any-
thing else, and thus, the money ceases to be a liability and becomes
a source of undistributed income, that is, net worth or equity (see
further below). See also Reis (2019) and Kumhof et al. (2020).
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something to the holder, there is a true debt; (ii) when
the outflow of resources is only probable, there is a provi-
sion; (iii) when the outflow of resources is only possible,
there is only a contingent liability; and (iv) when the
outflow of resources is remote, there is no liability at all
(IPSASB, 2020). Accordingly, this official pronouncement,
too, supports the AVM in concluding that when money is
irredeemable, it is not a liability of the issuing entity.
But, if irredeemable fiat money is not a liability, what
is state money and how should it be accounted for (cor-
rectly) in financial reports?
When the state issues irredeemable fiat money (i.e.,
representation of value created ex nihilo) and sells in
exchange for goods and services (by spending it) or in
exchange for credit claims (when it lends it), the proceeds
originate a form of income, specifically “revenue income,”
which corresponds to the resources that fiat money allows
the state to acquire. Notice that income may take the form
of capital income or revenue income. The former does not
relate to running a business, while the latter typically
arises from running business activities (Maheswari, 2013).
Issuing state money thus generates seigniorage income
to the issuing state. This holds a fortioriwhen statemoney is
issued to outright finance government expenditures as its
nature of income (in terms of resources acquired) is imme-
diately evident. In any case, under current accounting prac-
tices, this income is (incorrectly) unreported in the income
statement of the issuing entity. In the case of the central
bank money, for instance, it is (incorrectly) reported under
the central bank’s “liabilities.”
In fact, when money is issued by a public-sector
entity, the income should accrue to the entity’s owners –
the citizens, as ideal “shareholders” of the “res pub-
lica,”⁷ and when money is issued by a privately owned
central bank, the income should accrue to the central
bank’s private owners. If the income is not distributed
to the owners, it should be recorded as retained earnings
and would become equity, consistent with BIS’s Archer
and Moser-Boehm (2013).
Issuing money is the same thing as producing and
selling goods, as money bears value similarly to any
goods. If money is sold (such as in exchange for goods
or assets) or loaned (leased), it falls under IFRS 15 and 16,
respectively. When money is sold against goods, services
or real or financial assets (such as, for instance, when the
central bank “prints” reserves and sell them against secu-
rities, which are claims on real resources), the proceeds
from such sales should be accounted for as revenue: the
fair value of the goods, services, or assets received in
exchange for money should be recognized as revenue
(see IFRS 15, Section 66 et ss.).
Notice that the margin between such revenue and the
cost of issuing (producing and distributing) money is
called “primary” seigniorage. Primary seigniorage is the
income (revenues minus costs) that the issuing entity
receives from the fiat money used to purchase any form
of value (goods, services, and financial and real assets),
that is, the value of the real resources that money can buy
minus its issuing cost (Chart 1).
Conversely, when money is leased (loaned), the money
issuer is the same as a lessor in a finance lease (and the
lessee receives all the risks and rewards associated with
the money leased, see IFRS 16, Appendix A). In this
case, the money leased is accounted for as credit (as it
is correctly done in current practice), not as a liability (as
it is incorrectly done in current practice), and the lessee
should account the money leased as an asset (as it is
correctly done in current practice, whereby it is recorded
as cash), while the associated debt should be accounted
for as a liability (as it is correctly done in current prac-
tice). The margin between the interest revenue and the
costs of issuing the loan is what is called “secondary”
seigniorage and should be recorded as revenue in the
financial statements of the issuing institution; it is the
interest income that the state receives on the money cre-
ated and loaned out.
Notice that when fiat money is loaned, the income to
the issuing entity combines both primary and secondary
seigniorage, which both originate from the use of the
value created by fiat to purchase real resources. From
this standpoint, and in terms of accounting, the perma-
nent or temporary time profile of the transaction is not
relevant. Income is generated through a money creation
transaction and can be undone through a transaction of
opposite sign, which destroys the money previously cre-
ated. Moreover, in accounting, the mutual offsetting of
entries is not admitted because it affects the clarity of
financial reports: when money is issued and leased,
capital increases, and any increases in capital are equity,
while the reverse holds when money is returned as loan
repayments. Yet, the sequence of offsetting transactions
does not alter the nature of money as equity. In addition,
to the extent that a net positive stock of money issued as
loans is outstanding, an equal positive stock of corre-
sponding revenues (i.e., primary seigniorage) is also

7 Of our same view is Kumhof et al. (2020). Notice, that when the
central bank is a private institution (as it sometimes happens even in
modern times), the seigniorage from printing money and undistrib-
uted to the treasury increases the central bank shareholders' net
worth.
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outstanding, which in accounting terms represent the
equity of the money issuer.
Nowadays, only a fraction of secondary seigniorage
(that on banknotes) is recorded in central bank financial
statements, while primary seigniorage and secondary
seigniorage on reserves are concealed – the former is
recorded on the claims side of the balance sheet (among
the liabilities) and the latter is mixed with other revenues
and expenses of the income statement and not properly
evidenced.
The current practice, thus, bears an evident incon-
sistency between the correct accounting rule adopted for
the lessee and the incorrect one adopted for the lessor.
Accumulated revenues in the form of primary and sec-
ondary seigniorage constitute equity for the issuing insti-
tution. The assimilation of money to equity requires
moving beyond the distinction between equity and liabil-
ities, as discussed in Section II. A correct application of
the IFRS should recognize that money accepted as legal
tender or as a settlement instrument is not a financial
instrument for the holder and, therefore, it cannot be
debt for the issuer. International Accounting Standard
(IAS) 32 defines a “financial instrument” as “a contract
that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a
financial liability or equity instrument of another entity”
and defines an “equity instrument” as “any contract that
evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity
after deducting all of its liabilities” (par. 11). Under these
definitions, state money is neither “credit” for its holders
nor “debt” (i.e., a liability) for its issuer (Box 1). It is
instead the net wealth of the holders and the net worth
(equity) of the issuer.
Box 1: Isn’t money a financial sector’s liability?
The economy’s total net worth is in the balance sheets of real-
sector agents. Money is their asset. Every financial asset is some
counterparty’s liability, and the only counterparty for real-sector
agents as a consolidated sector is the financial sector (including
the central bank). Isn’t thus money a financial sector’s liability?
No, it isn’t.
Representing the economy in two consolidated entities, the real




Once fiat money is created, it represents value that can be used to purchase any other forms of value (goods, services, 
financial and real assets). The central bank, for instance, can use it in repurchase agreements, which are legally defined 
as sales of money against assets (typically, but not exclusively, government bonds) with a commitment from the 
counterparty to repurchase the assets in exchange for money at some future date. (In fact, even when the central bank 
lends money to borrowers, it “sells” money and “buys”, in exchange, debt obligations from the borrowers.)  
The critical aspect is that the value created by the central bank ex nihilo is exchanged by the central bank for real 
resources or promises to receive real resources. The value of the money created by the act of fiat and used to purchase 
(claims on) real resources is a source of income for the issuing central bank, from the accounting standpoint, and to the 
extent that this income is undistributed, it is equity in accounting terms.   
When commodities are sold, the entries in a double-entry scheme are as follows: 
By Receivables To Revenues 
By Cost of sale To Commodities 
where Receivables and Commodities are assets in the balance sheet and Revenues and Cost of sale are items of the 
income statement. Their difference accrues to equity as income (i.e., changes of equity). 
When money is produced and allocated, it can be identically represented as: 
By Securities To Revenues 
By Cost of money production To Money 
Here, the assets exchanged are Securities and Money (rather than Receivables and Commodities, as under commodities) 
and the Cost of sales and Revenues are the same: respectively, the decrease of equity needed for producing the good 
(either money or commodities) and the increase of equity obtained from its sale. All undistributed net revenues accrue
to equity (i.e., changes of equity). 
Chart 1: Primary seigniorage in accounting.
Assets Claims
Physical goods (among which
money, as a product used
for exchange purposes)
Liabilities = Debts toward the
financial sector
Money Equity = Difference between
assets and liabilities (part of
which is kept by the financial
sector as shares)
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Financial Sector
Money is a “product” produced by the financial sector. Once
“sold,” it accrues to financial sector equity and becomes good
in the full possession of the real sector. Money produced and
not yet sold would temporarily transit from the Assets side of
the financial sector’s balance sheet, as it would be the case of
coins produced by the treasury and not yet sold to the real sector;
however, the real sector holds nothing to claim on the financial
sector in exchange for money. In what sense is then money a
credit for the real sector and a debt for the financial sector?
It is only a good that the real sector uses within itself, and not
for claiming anything from the financial sector. In conclusion,
after consolidating the balance sheets across all sectors of
the economy, money ends up on the Assets side of the consoli-
dated balance sheet, while net revenues frommoney issuance end
up on the Claims side of the balance sheet (thereby becoming
net worth or equity): the financial sector owes no debt to the
real sector.
Money accounted as issuer’s equity implies owner-
ship rights. It is important to emphasize that these rights
do not give money holders any possession entitlement
over the entity issuing the money. Unlike the rights
enshrined in shares, the equity that stands against money
does not give money holders any residual claims on the
net assets of the issuing entity, much as consumers
buying goods from firms do not hold ownership rights
on the selling firms. Money holders hold rights that are
identical to those acquired by consumers purchasing
goods from firms since selling goods that deliver utility
to consumers is not conceptually dissimilar from selling
an instrument, like money, which delivers to its acquirers a
specific type of utility– that of settling financial obligations.⁸
The rights embedded in money holdings consist of
claims on nominal shares of national wealth, which
money holders may exercise at any time (Box 2). Those
who receive these claims acquire generalized purchasing
power on national wealth, while those issuing the claims
get in exchange a form of the gross income of equal nom-
inal value: This income corresponds to the real resources
the issuers can buy with the claims issued.
Box 2: Money “claims:” what are they?
If, in an economy, people conventionally agree to sell products,
services or assets to one another in exchange for an intrinsically
valueless object called “money,” then, in force of that very same
conventional agreement, people believe that such money gives
their holders a “claim” that can be used to purchase products,
services, or assets in exchange for it. Now, this claim is not
enforced by law, and it does not bind anybody to engage unwil-
lingly in the exchange process nor does it raise any liability upon
any individual agent specifically. Rather, it gives money holders
a generalized entitlement on the economy at large (and on all of
its agents) to exchange their money holdings in transactions
taking place at terms and conditions that are mutually and freely
agreed upon between the transacting parties.
Saying that money is a “claim” on society’s wealth does not
mean that people are forced to sell their values in exchange
for money. It means only that people must accept money if
they want to sell their values. The core issue here is one of
“prevalence of substance over form,” which is typically encoun-
tered in the accounting practice. Money is not a legal or formal
right over something or somebody, but a substantial claim over a
nominally equivalent share of society’s wealth, to be exercised
under free will.
Should people not understand money as such, they would not
accept it in the exchange process and money would be worth
nothing as a result.
Based on double-entry rules, money under the pro-
posed AVM is equity on the Claims side of the balance
sheet and cash on the Asset side. When the money cre-
ated is “sold” or “leased,” the value received in exchange
is recorded on the Assets side and replaces cash, while
the Claims side remains unaltered. For the stakeholders
of financial statements, it is relevant to receive two kinds
of information: first, the evidence of the source of income
as separate from the general revenues, and not to be con-
fused with liabilities; second, since the money created (by
fiat) is either “sold” or “leased,” there must be some dis-
tinct evidence of the income received, namely, net “rev-
enue” from selling money (primary seigniorage) and the
interest income from leasing it (secondary seigniorage).
This distinction is useful both to avoid confusion
between the two different sources of income and different
types of money: only the state can appropriate directly
and spend the income from primary seigniorage through
Assets Claims
Assets = Credits towards the real
sector + Money + shares in the
real sector equity
Liabilities = None
Equity = Difference between
assets and liabilities =
Assets

8 However, the similarity between money and goods in providing
utility to holders and consumers, respectively, does not eliminate
money’s unique features of zero (or negligible) elasticity of
production and zero (or negligible) elasticity of substitution
(Davidson, 1972).
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coins issuance; all other issuing-money agents can only
accumulate primary seigniorage into equity. Conversely,
secondary seigniorage is already included in the Income
Statement, and thus, there is appropriate evidence for
it, although it is confused among several types of inter-
mediation revenues.
3.1.2 Implications
Several critical financial and fiscal implications follow
from the proposed approach, which all represent impor-
tant new contributions of the AVM. First, income from
seigniorage is systematically concealed and seigniorage
is not recorded in the income statement (where it should
naturally belong), while it is recorded on the balance
sheet under debt liabilities, thus originating outright
incorrect accounting records.
Second, primary seigniorage, that is, the income that
derives from the money that is created ex nihilo and by
fiat decisions andmay be used to finance any exchange of
value, should be distinguished from secondary seignio-
rage, which derives from the interest income received on
the money that is issued and loaned. The state does not
receive any secondary seigniorage from coins (they are
not loaned), while central banks receive primary seignio-
rage from banknotes and reserve issuances (they typi-
cally account only for the former and not for the latter)
and receive secondary seigniorage from reserve lending.
Third, central banks with the power to issue the
national currency may “create” their own capital, and
they can do so at any time they need to. In other words,
to the extent that a central bank retains the power to issue
money, it can never find itself in a position of having to
request for recapitalization by the government.
Just by way of digression, the power to create one’s
own capital is perhaps the most vivid example of what
economists refer to as a “free lunch.” The free lunch from
money issuance may be socially beneficial if the newly
created purchasing power is employed to mobilize other-
wise unutilized resources and to produce new output, or
it may resolve only into higher prices with no net social
benefits if no unused capacity is available. In this last
case, however, the money issuer would still enjoy a free
lunch in that it holds a claim on real resources that it
would not hold, absent that power. Following money issu-
ance, the whole “pie” of real resources would be smaller
for each eater (due to the effect on prices), but a share of
the pie would go to the one eater who has not contributed
to its preparation: indeed, a free lunch for him, though
at the expense of those who actually contributed to the
pie (in other words, a “zero sum game” in which the money
issuer gets the positive term of the algebraic addition).
One could add that the former situation (one where there
is unused capacity) is Pareto improving, while the latter
is not. Obviously, should the money creation power be
abused and engender hyperinflation, even themoney issuer
would no longer be in a position to appropriate a positive
share of the pie and the whole pie might actually shrink
overall.
From the power to create its own capital, it follows that
central bank independence may never be threatened by pro-
blems of undercapitalization and that the “optimality” of
central bank capital can be defined only in relation to the
monetary policy objectives that the central bank is man-
dated to pursue. That is why central bank capital matters:
a structural tendency toward negative capital, for instance,
which would require continuous “self-creation” of capital
by the central bank, would be inconsistent– and therefore
suboptimal– vis-à-vis a low inflation objective, while a
structural tendency to a too high level of capital would be
inconsistent– and therefore, again, suboptimal– vis-a vis a
full-employment objective (Archer & Moser-Boehm, 2013).
Fourth, the aforementioned implications identify with
clarity who would be in a position to provide the ultimate
backstop in a crisis situation. Discussions around the
backstop function often entail a (rather paradoxical) cir-
cularity argument whereby when at stake is the risk of a
government defaulting on its own debt obligations, the
monetization of debt through money creation is usually
considered – at least, in principle – as providing the last-
resort remedy to avoid default: the central bank would be
the backstop. On the other hand, when at stake is the risk
of a central bank running into financial losses, the govern-
ment is invoked as the last-resort provider of the extra
capital needed to rebuild the central bank’s equity posi-
tion: in this case, the backstop is the government. Yet, the
two options cannot be true at the same: the true backstop
can be only the entity that holds the power to issue the
currency. Buiter (2008) argues that the taxpayer, through
the state treasury, is the ultimate and only guarantor of
central bank solvency. In fact, based on the aforemen-
tioned argument, Buiter’s assertion holds in the deeper
and more general sense that the backstop function can
only work if there are real resources available in the
economy that can be extracted from their owners (through
either explicit taxation or the implicit (inflation) tax inherent
inmoney creation) for the purpose of financing the backstop.
It should be noted, however, that even before getting to
the point where real resources are physically exhausted, in
actual circumstances, a confidence crisis in a country eco-
nomy might be such that people would want to dump both
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government debt and cash in exchange for foreign securi-
ties, thereby neutralizing the ultimate backstop role of the
central bank. Under such circumstances, the backstop func-
tion (its financing) could be provided only by an external
entity. The key conclusion, here, is that while financial
capital is not a constraint on central banks (in the sense
that central banks can always “produce” their own capital),
they should never want to find themselves in situations
where their capital position is inconsistent with their policy
objectives and the need to protect their (internal and
external) credibility.
Fifth, under the accounting practices currently adopted
by national governments and central banks, seigniorage
is largely underappreciated. It will be necessary to identify
all sources of seigniorage and estimate it, as well as the share
of seigniorage that is returned to its potential “owners” (its
holders), and to assess its impact on economic activity,
the economy’s incentive structure, and the distribution of
national wealth across society. Moreover, for public finance
purposes, the application of correct financial accounting
principles would allow to increase the transparency of the
fiscal budgets and central bank balance sheets by removing
the incorrect practice of associating state money to “debt.”
Finally, an argument can be made whereby the govern-
ment should be entitled to receiving back the (correctly esti-
mated) seigniorage extracted by the central bank from the
economy (after having made provisions for covering the cen-
tral bank’s running and capital costs). This would in no way
weaken the financial position of the central bank, which
would always be able to operate the country’s monetary
policy agenda based on its underlying objectives and with
not the concern for its own level of equity. The use of seignio-
rage income by the government would be a fiscal policy
decision that should be subject to the country’s political pro-
cess, taking into consideration distributional and macroeco-
nomic aspects, but having clear in mind the principle that
seigniorage income ultimately originates from, and belongs
to, the wealth of the country’s citizens.
3.2 Commercial Bank Money
After long being a tenet of post-Keynesian theories of money,
even mainstream economics has recognized that commercial
banks are not simple intermediaries of already existingmoney–
they create their ownmoney by issuing liabilities in the form of
demand deposits (McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014).⁹
In fact, in contemporary economies, the largest bulk
of money is created by commercial banks (Ryan-Collins,
Greenham, Werner, & Jackson, 2011).
Banks create money by lending or selling deposits
against securities. When banks create money, they do not
need to raise deposits to lend or sell deposits (Werner,
2014). Yet, they must avail themselves of the cash and
reserves necessary to guarantee cash withdrawals from
clients and to settle obligations emanating from client
instructions to mobilize deposits to make payments or
transfers.¹⁰
The relevant payment orders are only those between
clients of different banks, since the settlement of pay-
ments between clients of the same bank (“on us” pay-
ments) does not require the use of reserves and takes
place simply by debiting and crediting accounts held
on the books of the same bank. For cash withdrawals
and interbank payments, every bank must determine
the optimal amount of cash and reserves needed to cover
deposits. These reserves consist of (i) cash reserves and
reserves deposited with the central bank; (ii) reserves
from the settlement of incoming payments from other
banks; (iii) borrowings from the interbank market; (iv)
borrowings from the central bank; (v) immediate liquida-
tion of unencumbered assets in the balance sheet; and
(vi) new deposits of cash from old and new clients. The
new noncash deposits from clients can consist of only
deposits transferred from other banks, which fall under
item (ii).
3.2.1 Accounting Treatment
Commercial bank money constitutes a debt liability for
deposit issuing banks since these are under an obligation
to convert deposits into cash on demand from their cli-
ents and to settle payments in central bank reserves at the
time required by payment system settlement rules.
However, in a fractional reserve regime, banks hold
only a fraction of reserves against their total deposit

9 For a recent review (and a new perspective) on bank money crea-
tion, see Bossone (2020).

10 Most contemporary payment settlement systems require that
settlement takes place in central bank money. However, the prin-
ciple of using safe assets for settlement is also adopted by those
systems where central bank money is not available, and settlement
can only happen in commercial bank money. Here, participating
banks must first elect the money liability issued by one of them –
typically, the one that is most highly reputed and financially solid
and large – and then hold enough balances of such money for set-
tlement purposes (CPSS, 2013).
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liabilities. The amounts of reserves they actually use for
settling interbank obligations are only a fraction of the
total transactions settled. The more limited is the use of
cash in the economy, and the larger the economies of
scale in the use of reserves (as permitted by payment
system rules and clients’ nonsimultaneous mobilization
of deposits), the lower is the volume of reserves that
banks need to back up the issuance of new deposits.
Payment system rules affect the use of reserves via
two channels: the settlement modality (i.e., netting or
gross settlement) and the technology adopted. Modern
technologies introduce elements of netting into gross set-
tlement processes and increase the velocity of circulation
of reserves, thereby allowing banks to economize on the
use of reserves for any given volume and value of pay-
ments settled. In the hypothetical case of a fully consoli-
dated banking system in a cashless economy where all
agent accounts sit with only one bank, all payments and
transfers would be “on us” for the bank. The bank would
need no reserves for settling transactions and would be
under no debt obligation to its clients, and it might create
all the money that the economy would be willing to
absorb, without any need for holding reserves. In such
a case, the money would have the same power as legal
money in settling all debts.
In real-world economies, however, there are multiple
banks whose payment activities generate interbank settle-
ment obligations. Yet, the fractional reserve regime and the
economies of scale that are made possible both by payment
system rules and by depositors’ asynchronous mobiliza-
tion of deposits reduce the volume of reserves needed
by the banks to back their debts. Under increasing scale
economies, banks can create more liabilities (by lending
or selling deposits) with decreasing reserve margins for
coverage. From both the aforementioned hypothetical
case and this last observation follows that, all else equal,
a more consolidated banking system affords individual
banks lower coverage of their liabilities (and at lower
cost) than a less concentrated system would.
More generally, absent (very extreme) adverse eco-
nomic or market contingencies inducing depositors either
to convert their deposit claims into cash or to transfer them
across banks, the liabilities represented by deposits only
partly constitute debt liabilities of the issuing bank, which
require cash and reserve coverage.
By way of example, assume that debts are settled with
reserves and banks create and issue deposit claims by
lending them to clients at an interest. Under a fractional
reserve regime, the outstanding stock of the deposits created
by the banks is backed only partially (fractionally) with
(costly) reserves (ever undermostmarket stress circumstances).
In this case, the “unbacked” stock of deposits (i.e., the stock
of interest-earning loaned deposits net of the stock of costly
reserves), which banks can create at will (until they find
borrowers willing to borrow at the given terms and condi-
tions), is a free resource that banks have used to “buy”
revenue earning assets (i.e., the interest earning credit
claims). In the banks’ balance sheet, these real claims are
recorded on the assets side (until they are repaid) and the
free resource created (as determined above) should be
recorded as equity.
In other words, in fractional reserve regimes, the
uncovered part of the banks’ deposit liabilities are a
free resource that did not exist before its creation and,
once created, can be used to buy claims on real resources
(say, loans generating capital and interest payments).
This free resource is a source of income accruing to the
deposit issuing banks. To the extent that this income is
accumulated and undistributed, it is equivalent to equity
and should be accounted accordingly. Demand deposits,
therefore, consist of “debt deposits” and “equity deposits.”
This (admittedly controversial)proposition is further explained
in Box 3.
Box 3: Commercial bank deposits as equity: Objections and responses
Commercial bankmoney cannot be equity: holding it does not grant its
holders any residual claims on the issuing banks
The AVM adopts the distinction between “equity” and “capital,” the
latter being one component of the former. The other component is
“retained earnings.” The issuance of commercial bank money gener-
ates revenues for the issuing banks, exactly like the sale of goods does
for a firm. Those who purchase deposits (depositors in exchange for
funds and borrowers in exchange for credit claims) do not get residual
claims on the issuing banks anymore thanbuyers or leasers of goodsdo
on the selling or leasing firms.
But selling goods and selling money are different things!
No, they are not.Money grants access to economic benefitsmuch as any
other consumer good does. Goods deliver utility from consumption;
money delivers utility from its ability to settle transactions. For money
sellers, money is a source of revenue, much as goods are for producing
firms. For firms, revenue equals the money received in exchange for
selling goods; for banks, revenue is the cash, reserves, or credit claims
received in exchange for selling deposit claims.
Well, thismay hold for statemoney; it doesn’t hold for commercial bank
money, though: the latter is always a liability for the issuing bank
Banks are liable to convert deposits into cash on demand and to cover
them with central bank reserves for settlement purposes. Yet, due to
scale economies in payment systems and depositors’ asynchronous
mobilization of deposits, banks operating in fractional reserve
regimes need to back only a fraction of their deposit liabilities
with cash or central bank reserves. The fraction of uncovered
deposits is a source of revenue, which, once accumulated and
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undistributed, becomes equity. The circumstances that partial
coverage raises risk and that the share of uncovered deposits is
uncertain ex ante do not change the fact that they are a source of
revenue.
Yes, but this then involves the concept of probability
The conceptual framework (referred to in the text) states that the
concept of probability is not a relevant factor for the determina-
tion of the nature of a liability. It becomes relevant to determine
how a liability is to be reflected in the financial statements. The
conceptual framework recognizes that when liabilities show a
low probability of generating financial obligations, they may be
recorded as “contingent liabilities” in the notes to the financial
statements (not in the financial statements themselves) and may
even go unrecorded if the probability is very low.
Why would a contingent liability ever become revenue?
Revenues, like all components of equity, are a residual between
assets and liabilities. The purpose of equity is to ensure that the
fundamental identity Asset – Liabilities = Equity holds at all
times. If a liability is written off, the resulting gap determines
residually an addition to net worth (hence, it constitutes rev-
enue). This conclusion is inescapable.
Yet: how is it possible that deposits are a source of revenue for
the issuing bank and assets for their holders?
As discussed earlier, deposits are a hybrid instrument. Ex ante,
they can be either a liability or equity. Fractional coverage
ensures that, under most contingencies (including extreme eco-
nomic and financial situations, as the global financial crisis has
shown), a share of deposits will become equity, and the
banking system won’t find itself under an obligation to convert
all outstanding deposits into cash or central bank reserves.
Indeed, the institutional arrangements supporting the banking
system (e.g., central banks acting as lenders of last resort, other
liquidity provision mechanisms, and deposit insurance guar-
antee schemes) ensure that a fraction of outstanding deposits
will– under most circumstances – feature the nature of equity.
Still puzzling: if a deposit is a credit for the depositor, should not it
be a debt for the bank?
Demand deposits are never reported as credit or financial assets in
the financial statements of their holders; they are reported instead
as cash and equivalents on hand. The correct question, therefore,
is: If they are not credit, why should they be debt? In fact, they are
not; they entail for the issuing banks an obligation that is similar to
debt. A demand deposit is a contract where the depositor swaps
cash or funds with its bank against claims to access those cash and
funds on demand. The bank commits to ensuring that such conver-
sion is guaranteed at all times it is requested. As mentioned earlier,
however, the share of claims that remain unconverted are a source
of revenue for the bank and are thus part of its equity.
The double nature of deposits is stochastic in as
much as, at the time of issuance, every deposit unit can
be either a debt-deposit (if, with a certain probability the
issuing bank receives requests for cash conversion or
interbank settlement) or an equity-deposit (with comple-
mentary probability). Faced with such stochastic double
nature of its money, a commercial bank finds it conve-
nient to provision the deposit unit issued with a level of
reserves that equals only the expected value of the asso-
ciated debt event (possibly augmented by some unex-
pected variation margin), rather than the full value of
the deposit unit issued.
Here, “stochastic” refers to the fact that – ex ante –
a bank creating one unit of deposit expects (probabilisti-
cally) that only some share of that unit will translate into
debt, while the remaining share (still probabilistically)
will not be subject to requests for conversion into cash
or reserves. The share of debt-deposits (or equity-deposit,
as its complement) is a stochastic variable that is influ-
enced by behavioral and institutional factors (e.g., cash
usage habits and payment system rules) as well as by
contingent events. In times of market stress, the share
of debt-deposit tends to increase, while it tends to be
low when trust in the economy (and the banking system
in particular) is strong. Policy and structural factors
that strengthen such trust (e.g., the elasticity with which
the central bank provides liquidity to the system when
needed or a deposit insurance mechanism) increase the
share of equity-deposits.
This argument is evident when applied to the whole
banking system, but it holds also for each individual
bank, albeit to different extents depending on the size
of each bank for a given payment settlement system
and cash usage and on its risk profile, where size refers
to the volume and value of payment transactions that the
bank intermediates relative to the total payment transac-
tions in the system. From the discussion so far, it follows
that, all else being equal, the stochastic share of debt-
deposits for a small bank is greater than for a larger bank.
Vice versa, the larger is the bank, the greater is the share
of equity contained in its deposit liabilities.
In conclusion, while the conventional view holds
that commercial bank money (demand deposits) is a lia-
bility (debt) of the issuing commercial banks, the AVM
argues that, in a fractional reserve regime, commercial
bank money is only partly a debt obligation of the issuing
commercial bank, with the residual part constituting
equity of the same commercial bank in the form of accu-
mulated and undistributed income. As in the case of state
money discussed earlier, however, such equity would
correspond to the accumulated and undistributed income
generated by deposits and should therefore not be con-
fused with bank’s capital with its attendant rights and
obligations.
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3.2.2 Consistency with International Accounting
Standards
The stochastic double nature of commercial bank money
is consistent with the definition of liability provided
by the new Conceptual Framework under IASB (2018),
whereby “a liability is a present obligation of the entity
to transfer an economic resource as a result of past events”
(Section 4.26, Conceptual Framework) and “Financial
reports represent economic phenomena in words and
number. To be useful, financial information must not only
represent relevant phenomena, but it must also represent
the substance of the phenomena that it purports to repre-
sent. In many circumstances, the substance of an economic
phenomenon and its legal form are the same. If they are not
the same, providing information only about the legal form
would not faithfully represent the economic phenomenon”
(Section 2.12, Conceptual Framework).
In light of these definitions, demand deposits are a
hybrid instrument – partly debt and partly revenue. The
debt part relates to the share of deposits that will (likely)
be converted into banknotes on demand or into reserve
for payment settlement purposes and reflects the “sub-
stance” of the obligation underlying the deposit contract.
The revenue part, on the other hand, relates to the share
of deposits that will (likely) never be converted into bank-
notes or reserves and reflects the mere “legal form” under-
lying the deposit contract. This share of deposits is a source
of revenue. Once accumulated, this revenue becomes equity.
It should be noted that equity-deposits are not necessarily
inert deposits; theymostly comprise deposit flows that move
across accounts held in the book of the same bank and
deposit flows that offset each other before settlement,
none of which require reserves.
Now, since there are no accounting standards gov-
erning hybrid revenue-liability instruments explicitly,
IAS 32 applies (in force of the analogy stated in IAS 8)
and provides that, in the context of a hybrid liability
instrument, the debt component must be separated from
the equity one.¹¹ From such separation follows that, once
the debt component is identified, the residual left is the
equity component.¹² In the case of deposits, the share of
deposits that (most probably) will not translate into debt
liabilities represent retained earnings (that is, equity capital).
The application of IAS 32 is a textbook case. It implies
that the financial statements of the issuing bank should
report among debts only the share of deposits that give
origin to a substantial obligation to transfer economic
resources, while the residual share should be reported
in the income statement as revenue. Moreover, since
the share of profits attributable to this revenue is undis-
tributed, they add to the bank’s equity.
To support the validity of the approach here pro-
posed, take IAS 37 (on risk provisioning, charges, and
contingent liabilities).¹³ This standard considers as debt
all commitments that fall under the Conceptual Framework’s
definition of “liability,” that is, those that generate out-
flows of economic resources with a probability greater
than 0.5. Below such threshold, the liability is a contin-
gent liability andmust be reported only in the notes to the
financial statements. Take also the recent innovation by
IPSASB (2020), referred to in Section 3.1., which is very con-
sistent with the AVM. In this regard, it should be noted that
although the scope of the IPSAS extends to the public sector,
the important innovation of the IPSAS as regards the treat-
ment of liabilities is also in principle relevant for private
sector entities, and such that private sector accounting fra-
mework should not neglect. Much as we have expressed our
belief that the IFRS can contribute new blood into public
sector accounting rules and practices, we also believe that
new public sector accounting rules and practices could as
well be valid for private sector businesses when they refer to
general principles (as in the case of liabilities).
The implication is inescapable: the existence of formal
claims is not alone sufficient for a liability to be considered
as debt; the essential requisite is the probable outflows of
economic resources. The probability is not per se relevant; it

11 Specifically, IAS 8 (Section 10–11) requires that, “In the absence
of an IFRS that specifically applies to a transaction, other event or
condition…management shall refer to, and consider the applic-
ability of, the following sources in descending order: (a) the require-
ments in IFRSs dealing with similar and related issues; and (b) the
definitions, recognition criteria and measurement concepts for assets,
liabilities, income and expenses in the Conceptual Framework.”

12 See IAS 32, Sections 28 et ss. It is noteworthy that, in the case
under the quoted standard, the hybrid instrument has the nature of
“liabilities-capital,” not “liabilities-revenue;” however, both capital
and retained earnings belong to equity. Briefly, equity can be shared
into at least two major components: capital and other ownership’s
contributions, on the one hand, and retained earnings on the other
hand. IAS 32 provides regulation for splitting hybrid instruments
between one part that is recognized as liabilities and one part that
is recognized as equity. Based on the definitions of the Conceptual
Framework, once the component recognizable as a liability is iden-
tified, the residual component is attributed to equity.
13 See IAS 37, Section 12–13, where the fundamental distinction is
drawn between the adjective “probable” for the debt liabilities and
the adjective “possible” for contingent liabilities to be reported in
the notes to the financial statements.
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is so only if it allows for a faithful representation of the
transactions involved as the aim is to provide information
that is useful to investors, lenders, and other creditors.¹⁴ In
the case of commercial bank money, the share of deposits
that are not debt liabilities must be regarded as revenue, and
since such revenue is not reported in the income statement,
it constitutes retained earnings (equity).
3.2.3 A Third Accounting Category Beyond Liabilities
and Equity?
While, in principle, the distinction between liabilities and
equity does not seem to admit any tertius genus, the AVM
suggests the possibility of a new accounting subcategory
within the equity category. Traditionally, equity consists
of capital, capital reserves, and retained earnings; a more
recent addition is “reserves deriving from other compre-
hensive income” (previously called “capital maintenance
adjustments”). The arguments underpinning the AVM
point to the need for a new class of “cash reserves,”
which would reflect the equity share of money issuance.
A new category of hybrid instruments would emerge as
a result: not between securities and shares (like tradi-
tional hybrid instruments), but between securities and
revenues. Once capitalized, such revenues would merge
in the new cash reserves subcategory. The proposed
accounting treatment of money features interesting ana-
logies with the way insurance liabilities are treated accor-
ding to international standards (Box 4).
Box 4: Commercial bank deposits as equity: Analogies with the
insurance sector
According to the recently issued IFRS 17 (on insurance con-
tracts), upon collection of premium payments or from the time
a new policy contract is issued, and the cash or credit position of
the insurer is equivalently adjusted on the asset side of its bal-
ance sheet, on the claim side only one part of the insurer’s
liabilities becomes debt, reflecting the discounted value of its
future expected obligations to customers, as adjusted for risks
and other factors.
The remaining part, which will not be used to fund future
fulfillment obligations to customers, is only temporarily treated
as a liability. Subsequently, since it represents “deferred income,”
it is recorded as revenue and distributed across future financial
statements based on an amortization plan that is estimated taking
into account the insurer’s provision of future services.
Why is the revenue distributed across a multi-year time horizon?
Because it is linked to a series of future countervailing obligations
and, therefore, it may not be “earned” all at once by the insurer.
As the flow of future obligations mature, the revenue is recorded
in the insurer’s financial statements; if it is not distributed, it is
allocated to equity.
In the case of commercial bank money, since no residual obliga-
tions are left for the issuing bank to fulfill beyond the liquidity
(i.e., central bank reserves) that the bank makes available to its
depositors on a fractional basis, the nondebt share of the deposits
held with it can be entirely recorded as revenue in the financial
statements. Unlike the case of the insurer, such revenue is
“earned” at once by the issuing bank and can thus be allocated
to equity.
3.2.4 Implications
In fractional reserve regimes, commercial bank money –
that is, demand deposit claims issued by commercial
banks – has a double nature: it is partly a debt obligation
and partly equity of the issuing commercial banks. This
double nature originates from the power of banks to
create a form of money that only partially features the
nature of debt, as discussed earlier.
Some critical implications follow, which represent
new contributions of the AMV in addition to those dis-
cussed earlier concerning state money. The first implica-
tion is that a relevant share of deposits that banks report
in their financial statements as “debt toward clients” gene-
rate revenues that are analogous to the seigniorage rents
extracted from the economy by the state or the central
bank through the issuance of legal money (coins and
banknotes) and central bank reserves, respectively. This,
in turn, bears implications for the way banks’ capital is
calculated. Critical for this calculation is the probability
factor discussed earlier, which characterizes each bank
individually, depending on its relative size, its role in the
payment system, and its risk profile.
The objection to this is that the creation of demand
deposits cannot serve as a source of income since, should
a bank end up in insolvency, all deposits would be with-
drawn (to the extent that they are covered with assets or
guaranteed). In fact, international accounting standards
such the IFRS are conceived for, and hold, under the
hypothesis of going concern, not under the hypothesis
of liquidation. Under liquidation, money becomes a lia-
bility to the holders, just as the equity shares of a firm
become liabilities toward the shareholders for any resi-
dual value of the firm. This change of status, however,
does not (and cannot) change the ways transactions are

14 See IASB (2018), Section 5.17.
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represented in accounting terms, since substance must
always prevail over form in normal conditions. However,
as regards commercial bank money, under the AVM, only
secondary seigniorage is appropriated and potentially dis-
tributable to shareholders, while primary seigniorage is a
sui generis part of equity, not to be settled to holders (in
which case it would be a liability) and not be distributed to
shareholders, but to be kept invested in the bank.
The second implication is that commercial banks are
hybrid institutions much as demand deposits are hybrid
instruments. As issuers of debt-deposits (when they lend
money), commercial banks are pure intermediaries. As
issuers of equity-deposits, they are money creators. Due to
the scale economies in the use of reserves, discussed earlier,
smaller banks would tend to fall within the former category
and larger banks in the latter. Notice that while the income
earned on debt-deposits originates from intermediation,
income on equity-deposits constitutes seigniorage.
Third, commercial bank seigniorage represents a struc-
tural element of acquisition of net real resources from
the economy, and it is essentially a cost item for firms bor-
rowing money to support production, with a rise in seignio-
rage potentially bearing implications that should deserve
attention. Policy considerations could, for instance, be given
to reducing seigniorage (say, by increasing banking sector
competition or by limiting the average size of banks) or to
transfer part of it back to the economy through the fiscal
budget.
However, the merits of policy decisions in this area
transcend the scope of this study. It should only be noted
that the various tradeoffs involved in such decisions call
for future research. For instance, if, on the one hand, a
decision to tax commercial bank seigniorage would be
justified on grounds that it represents a form of a private-
sector rent, on the other hand, the same decision should
recognize that part of seigniorage is a compensation
of commercial banks providing society with an elastic
mechanism of money issuance and a device to allocate
money across the economy more efficiently than under
a centralized mechanism. Issuing fiat money through a
market decentralized money supply system (i.e., the com-
mercial banking sector) affords much greater elasticity to
an economy than a state centralized system based on com-
modity money. The greater elasticity translates into a more
flexible and convenient accommodation of the money
supply to its dispersed demand than if the money supply
were determined by exogenous factors (e.g., the availability
of the underlying real commodity) and were managed in a
centralized fashion. A “normal” profit rate should therefore
remunerate banks for the value they add to the economy by
creating and allocating money as a public good, which the
public demands and is willing to hold for the services it
delivers. Seigniorage as unearned income would thus con-
sist of any profits associated with money creation, which
would accrue to banks in excess of the “normal” level.
Fourth, as a share of deposits are true liabilities,
liquid assets must be adequate to enable banks to with-
stand anticipated and unanticipated outflows of cash
and reserves. In addition, the primary seigniorage that
corresponds to equity-deposits should accrue to the
bank’s equity and should not be distributed as dividends.
Currently, a share of deposits are diverted to bank profits
through fees and commissions and are therefore priva-
tized by the bank shareholders through dividends, pos-
sibly in excess of “normal” profits and especially in the
case of banks with large bases of equity-deposits. The
privatization of such extra-profits detracts from the stable
flow of resource investment that should go into the bank.
Appropriate metrics should be developed to assess these
extra-profits quantitatively, which go beyond the scope
of this study.
Finally, the aforementioned arguments offer good
reasons why the equity originated by seigniorage should
be estimated and accounted for correctly, and why sta-
keholders (including the authorities) should be able to
identify it. In addition, correct accounting rules and value
estimates of seigniorage would provide reliable indica-
tors of the strengths of the accruing banks and a measure
of their true market power and systemic relevance. Our
main point is about one of the fundamental qualitative
characteristics that financial information should feature:
Faithful Representation. The fact that issuing money
increases the equity of the issuer has to be recognized
and represented faithfully, irrespective of the use of the
financial information.
4 Conclusion
Based on the correct application of international accounting
principles, this study has argued that fiat monies issued
by the state– typically in the form of cash, banknotes, and
central bank reserves– are not debt. The study has also
argued that, in a fractional reserve regime, only a share
of commercial bank money can be regarded as debt.
Proceeding separately for these broad types of money,
the study has determined the correct way to account for
the various forms of money in the financial statements
of the issuing institutions, clarifying what the different
accounting treatment implies for a correct understand-
ing of money and then laying the foundations for what
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was here labeled the AVM. Importantly, the AVM sheds
new light into such issues as the nature of central bank
capital, the nature of commercial bank money as a hybrid
instrument (partly debt and partly equity), and the nature
of commercial banks as hybrid institutions (partly pure
financial intermediaries and partly money creators).
The study has aimed to resolve the apparent inconsis-
tency between the formal rules of reportingmoney liabilities
in the financial statements of the issuing institutions, on the
one hand, and the economic substance of the money liabili-
ties to be reported in the statements, on the other hand.
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